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Recycling Petrodollars
Matthew Higgins, Thomas Klitgaard, and Robert Lerman
In recent years, oil-exporting countries have experienced windfall gains with the rise in the 
price of oil. A look at how oil exporters “recycle” their revenues reveals that roughly half of 
the petrodollar windfall has gone to purchase foreign goods, especially from Europe and China,
while the remainder has been invested in foreign assets. Although it is difficult to determine
where the funds are first invested, the evidence suggests that the bulk are ending up, directly 
or indirectly, in the United States.
I
n recent years,higher oil prices have led to a
significant redistribution of global income
from oil importers to oil exporters.1 Indeed,
exporters are likely to receive oil revenues of about $970 bil-
lion in 2006—an increase of almost $670 billion since
2002—with the bulk of these windfall gains going to just a
handful of countries.2
The way in which oil exporters deploy their revenues
has important implications for oil-importing countries.
Higher oil prices reduce purchasing power in oil-importing
countries and thus are a drag on their growth.But when oil
exporters use the revenues from oil sales to increase their
purchases of goods from oil-importing countries,these
negative effects on growth are reduced. Increased pur-
chases of foreign assets by oil exporters can also help 
sustain growth in oil-importing countries, albeit less
directly. Such asset purchases are a form of lending: In
effect,oil importers can sustain their consumption and
investment spending by borrowing from oil exporters to
finance their higher oil-import bills.
This edition ofCurrent Issuesexamines how oil-exporting
countries have deployed their oil revenues in recent years
and how this decision has affected oil-importing countries.
We find that thus far,exporters’oil revenues have been
about evenly split,with half going to increased purchases
of foreign goods and services and half going to increased
purchases of foreign assets.We also find notable differ-
ences across major oil-importing countries in how
petrodollars have been recycled.While Europe and China
have seen a large fraction of the increase in payments to oil
exporters return to purchase locally produced goods,the
United States and Japan have seen only a small fraction
return for this purpose.On the financial side,China and
Japan are running large current account surpluses, and
thus do not need to borrow to pay their higher oil-import
bills.Europe’s current account remains close to being bal-
anced, so it too has not engaged in net borrowing from
abroad. Among the major economies, only the United
States has been willing to increase its net borrowing in
recent years.As a result,whether directly or indirectly,the
bulk of the oil exporters’windfall has gone to finance the
large and growing U.S.current account deficit.
Oil Prices and Oil Revenues 
The global economy has had to adjust to large swings in oil
prices in the past (Chart 1).After the OPEC oil embargo
was imposed in late 1973,oil prices jumped from an average
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of slightly less than $4.00 a barrel to $11.40 a barrel in 1974
(or from about $16.75 to $45.40 a barrel in 2005 dollars,
adjusted using the U.S.consumer price index).3 A decrease
in Middle East oil production caused a second major oil
shock in 1979-80, pushing prices from approximately
$14.00 a barrel in 1978 to $37.20 a barrel in 1980 (or from
$41.95 to $88.25 a barrel in 2005 dollars).
The recent rise in oil prices rivals these two episodes in
magnitude, although it has occurred more gradually. Oil
prices averaged just under $25.00 a barrel in 2002 and
climbed only modestly in 2003.In early 2004,in part owing
to surging demand by China,prices began a strong upward
trend,averaging $37.75 a barrel that year,$53.35 in 2005,
and $65.35 over the first ten months of 2006.
These three episodes of price volatility generated large
swings in export revenues for oil-exporting countries.4 In
1972,oil exporters recorded $24 billion in foreign sales.By
1974, after the first oil price shock, export revenues had
grown to $117 billion.Revenues increased steadily but not
dramatically over the next several years.The second oil price
shock,however,propelled export revenues to roughly $275 bil-
lion in 1980 and $250 billion in 1981.
The most recent rise in oil prices has meant new gains for
oil-exporting countries.All told,oil-export revenues appear
set to reach about $970 billion in 2006,up from just $300 bil-
lion in 2002.This dramatic increase raises the natural ques-
tion of how oil exporters have spent their windfall.
Deploying Petrodollars
Oil exporters have two options when deploying their revenue
windfall.The windfall can be used for imports of goods and
services,or it can be used to purchase foreign assets in the
international capital markets.
To analyze how these new revenues have been deployed,
we need to take account of the fact that non-oil exports by
oil-exporting countries have also risen in recent years.
Indeed,non-oil exports rose by roughly $310 billion from
2002 to 2006 (of which about $45 billion stems from higher
sales of natural gas).It is not possible practically or analyti-
cally to distinguish how oil revenues have been deployed
from how other export revenues have been deployed.
Accordingly,we rely on the combined export figure.
All told, oil exporters’ export revenues are projected to
exceed $1,500 billion in 2006,a jump of about $980 billion
since 2002 (Table 1).Ofthat increase,just under half,or about
$475 billion,has been going to increased imports of foreign
goods and services.Roughly another $485 billion has been
going to increased net purchases of foreign financial assets,
as reflected in oil exporters’ combined current account 
surplus.5 (Additional analysis of oil prices and the global
economy can be found in Rebucci and Spatafora [2006].)
2
1We use the International Monetary Fund’s definition of oil exporters—those
countries that currently derive the bulk of their export revenues from sales of
fuel.The countries are identified in Table 1; Norway has been added because
last year the country derived roughly 53 percent of export revenues from oil.
2Figures for 2006 are forecasts from the International Monetary Fund’s
September 2006 World Economic Outlook.In a few instances,the figures represent
our estimates using data available through October 2006.
3Oil prices are measured as the average of the prices for West Texas Intermediate,
U.K.Brent,and Dubai.
4A long history of data on these countries’oil-export revenues is not available,so
we use data on totalexport revenues.Data on oil-export revenues are available for
the more recent period.
Sources: U.S. Department of Energy; Haver Analytics.
Chart 1
Nominal and Real Oil Prices 
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Table 1
Oil Exporters’Deployment of Export Revenues
Billions of U.S.Dollars 
2002 2006 Change
Exports 535 1,516 981
minus
Imports 403 875 473
plus
Net other items -44 -70 -25
equals
Current account/
net foreign investment 88 571 483
Memo:
Oil exports 299 968 669
Other exports 236 548 312
Sources:International Monetary Fund;authors’estimates.
Notes:Oil exporters include Algeria,Angola,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,the Republic of the Congo,
Ecuador,Equatorial Guinea,Gabon,Iran,Iraq,Kuwait,Libya,Nigeria,Norway ,Oman,Qatar,
Russia,Saudi Arabia,Sudan,Syria,Trinidad and Tobago,Turkmenistan,the United Arab
Emirates,Venezuela,and Yemen.Figures for 2006 are forecasts.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
The Oil Windfall, Saving, and Consumption
Economic theory implies that a temporary income windfall
will largely be saved,while a permanent windfall will largely
be consumed.Are oil exporters behaving as if they believe
recent oil price increases will be temporary or permanent?
In fact, oil exporters’ saving has increased markedly 
in recent years,from roughly 28 percent of GDP in 2002 to 
39 percent in 2006 (Chart 2).6 During the same period,
domestic investment spending as a share of GDP has barely
budged.7 As a result,the increase in saving has been allo-
cated entirely to greater foreign asset accumulation.
(National saving is equal to the sum of domestic investment
spending and the current account balance,that is,net foreign
asset purchases.) 
Despite this pattern,it is too early to conclude that oil
exporters see the recent price increases as temporary.First,
it can take time to adjust consumption patterns,even if an
income windfall is believed to be permanent.Second,an
income windfall may need to persist before it is judged to be
permanent.If oil prices remain elevated,saving rates of oil
exporters might fall in the years ahead.Lower saving rates
would mean that a higher fraction of the oil exporters’
windfall is being spent on imports and a lower fraction on
foreign assets.
The historical behavior of imports in response to
changes in export revenues supports this conjecture
(Table 2).According to statistical estimates,a 10 percent
increase in oil exporters’export revenues is typically fol-
lowed by a slight further increase over the next twelve
months.However,export revenues generally taper off over a
twenty-four-month horizon,and even more so over a thirty-
six-month horizon.This result is not surprising,as past oil
price increases have tended to be partly reversed (Chart 1).
By comparison, import expenditures have tended to rise
gradually after an export windfall (Table 2). Six months
after a 10 percent jump in export revenues,import expendi-
tures are typically less than 4 percent higher.But import
expenditures generally continue to rise in subsequent
months. In fact, after thirty-six months, the percentage
increase in import expenditures has tended to rise slightly
past the remaining increase in export revenues.These esti-
mates conform with the visual evidence presented in Chart 3.
When exports have surged,imports have tended to follow
with a lag and to retain their gains even when exports later
stabilize or back down.
The prospect of a rise in oil exporters’import expendi-
tures in the future need not entail a one-for-one fall in saving.
Higher imports that reflect higher consumption do imply a
drop in saving. National saving, however, would remain
unchanged if higher imports were attributable to higher
domestic investment spending rather than to higher con-
sumption.Even so,the basic point remains: Going forward,
if oil prices remain elevated,more of the exporters’windfall
is likely to be spent on imports and less on purchases of
foreign assets.
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD); authors’ calculations.
Note: Values for 2006 are based on IMF and OECD forecasts.
Chart 2
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5Miscellaneous items in the balance of payments explain why the combined
increase in imports and investment abroad is slightly less than the increase in
export revenues.
6Unfortunately,it is not possible to construct a saving series that covers the
1973-74 and 1979-80 oil price shocks.Nevertheless,the very high saving rates
recorded in the early 1980s and the subsequent decline in rates over the decade
are consistent with what economic theory would predict for an income windfall
believed (correctly,in this case) to be mostly temporary.
7In dollar terms,investment spending roughly doubled between 2002 and 2006.
However,dollar GDP also doubled,leaving investment spending as a share ofGDP
unchanged.
Table 2
Oil Exporters’Response to an Increase in Revenues
Dynamic Response to a 10 Percent Increase in Export Revenues,1973-2005
Initial Six  Twelve Twenty-Four Thirty-Six
Increase Months Months Months Months
Exports 10.0 10.7 11.1 8.0 6.0
Imports 1.6 3.7 5.3 6.8 6.6
Source:Authors’estimates,based on data from the International Monetary Fund.
Notes:The results are derived from bivariate vector autoregression estimates,including the 
current value and twelve monthly lags of the natural logs of merchandise exports and 
merchandise imports,both measured in nominal dollars.The sample consists of countries
defined as oil exporters in the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics;
they form a somewhat narrower group of countries than the one identified in the text.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 12, NUMBER 9
The Geography of Petrodollar Recycling
Which countries have been benefiting from higher sales to oil-
exporting countries? And,on the financial side,which coun-
tries have been the destination of oil exporters’investments?
Merchandise Trade
There are considerable differences across major oil-importing
economies in the extent to which increased payments to oil
exporters have returned to purchase locally produced
goods.8 From 2002 to 2006,U.S.merchandise imports from
oil-exporting countries increased by $116 billion,reaching
$179 billion (Table 3).Merchandise exports to those coun-
tries increased by $23 billion over the same period,to total
$45 billion.All told,just 20 cents of each $1 in increased pur-
chases from oil exporters came back directly to the United
States in the form of higher purchases of U.S.goods.
These figures do not imply that U.S.export performance
to this group of countries was especially poor.In fact,the
percentage increase in U.S. sales to oil exporters over the
period,at 105 percent,is just slightly below the percentage
increase in sales by all countries to oil exporters.The small
fraction of trade payments returning to purchase U.S.goods
instead reflects the fact that sales to this group of countries
began from a very low sales base.
The euro area has seen a higher fraction of new payments
to oil exporters return to purchase locally produced goods.
Merchandise imports from oil-exporting countries more
than doubled from 2002 to 2006,rising by some $192 billion
to reach $316 billion.Over the same period,euro-area sales to
oil exporters climbed by $77 billion,reaching $167 billion.All
told,41 cents of each $1 of purchases from oil exporters came
back in the form of higher purchases of euro-area goods.
In percentage terms,euro-area sales to oil exporters rose
by 86 percent from 2002 to 2006—less than the percentage
increase in sales by the United States.The higher fraction of
euro-area purchases from oil exporters returning to buy
euro-area goods reflects a much higher initial sales base
compared with that of the United States.Geographic prox-
imity explains the higher sales base: Euro-area countries 
are closer than the United States to the major oil exporters
of the Middle East,and two large exporters—Norway and
Russia—are in Europe itself.
In this connection, the country breakdown we rely on
here may not adequately capture the relationship between oil
prices and the geographic pattern of U.S.trade.While easily
more than 90 percent of euro-area oil imports come from
countries we have classified as oil exporters,only half of U.S.
oil imports come from this group of countries.Canada and
Mexico,which are not in this group,are the sales leaders in
the U.S.market.However,because oil accounts for less than a
fifth of total merchandise imports from Canada and Mexico,
we cannot track how much of these countries’petrodollar
receipts were recycled to purchase U.S.goods.
In Asia,China has fared even better than the euro area in
seeing petrodollars recycled back home.Imports from oil-
exporting countries increased by $56 billion from 2002 to
2006 while sales grew by $34 billion,so that 60 cents of each
$1 sent abroad returned to purchase Chinese goods.
This high figure accords with the explosive growth of
China’s exports to all markets.Indeed,China’s exports grew by
179 percent over the period—an increase not too far below
the 238 percent rise in sales to oil exporters.Given China’s
gains in market share,the country might well have seen its
sales to oil exporters climb sharply, even if oil exporters’
purchases worldwide had remained flat in recent years.
4
Sources: United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database; International 
Monetary Fund.
Chart 3
Imports and Exports of Oil-Exporting Countries
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8We use merchandise trade data from major oil-importing economies because
they are more timely than data from oil exporters.
Table 3
Trade with Oil Exporters
Change from 2002 to 2006,Billions of U.S.Dollars
Imports Exports Ratio
United States 116.1 22.9 19.8
Euro area 191.5 77.5 40.5
China 56.1 33.5 59.7
Japan 70.4 12.9 18.3
Korea 42.0 10.1 24.0
Sources:U.S.Census Bureau;Eurostat;CEIC Data Company.
Note:The 2006 data are based on the most recently available twelve months,generally through
August or September 2006.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 5
Conversely,Japan and Korea saw a much smaller fraction
of petrodollar payments return home.In Japan,just 18 cents
ofeach $1 sent to oil-exporting countries was recycled to buy
Japanese products.The corresponding figure for Korea was
24 cents. In percentage terms, though, both countries 
saw very rapid sales growth to oil exporters—95 percent
and 113 percent,respectively—albeit from a low base.
One caveat is in order.Our analysis pertains only to “first-
round”trading relationships.In particular,an increase in
sales to oil exporters might result in higher imports from
third markets to acquire needed intermediate inputs.To the
extent this is the case,the fraction recycled back to a country
may be overstated,with some petrodollars flowing indirectly
to the third-market input producer.This caveat is particu-
larly relevant for China,where the import content of export
production is especially high.
Foreign Investment 
Oil exporters’ net financial investment in the rest of the
world is equivalent to the exporters’ combined current
account surplus. The combined surplus is projected to
exceed $570 billion in 2006,an increase of almost $485 bil-
lion from 2002 (Table 4).The main global counterpart to the
higher surplus has been a larger current account deficit in
the United States.Indeed,the U.S.deficit is projected to reach
almost $870 billion in 2006,up roughly $400 billion from
2002.In contrast,Asian economies are running large current
account surpluses.Europe’s current account is now roughly
balanced while current accounts in the rest of the world,as a
whole,have deteriorated and are now slightly in deficit.Of
course, absent the recent increase in oil prices, current
account balances in Asia would likely have moved still
higher, and balances in Europe and the rest of the world
might have remained stable or even increased. Thus, the
United States has been the only major economy willing to
take on sizable new foreign liabilities during the recent
period of rising oil prices.
It is natural to suppose,then,that the great bulk of oil
exporters’ net investment abroad must be going into the
United States.Yet the available data indicate that it is not—at
least not directly.
All told, net investment in the United States by oil
exporters came to just $224 billion from 2003 through 2005.9
Of that sum,$124 billion went to deposits and short-term
securities held at U.S.banks or nonbank financial institu-
tions,and another $107 billion went to purchase long-term
U.S.securities such as equities and Treasury bonds.A small
outflow of foreign direct investment from the United States
to oil exporters made up the gap. By country, Russia and
Norway easily accounted for more than half of net invest-
ment in the United States.During the first half of 2006,oil
exporters made an additional $45 billion in net investments
in the United States.If that pace is maintained during the
second half of the year,total investment in the country over
2003-06 would reach $314 billion.Such a sum would repre-
sent less than one-fourth of the more than $1,300 billion that
oil exporters have invested worldwide (their total combined
current account surplus for 2003-06).
Unfortunately,efforts to study this topic are complicated
by the fact that the U.S.data do not track the original source
of funds entering the country.For example,oil-export rev-
enues might be deposited in a London bank; the depositor
could then ask the bank to buy a U.S.bond or U.S.equity,
to be held for it in a custodial account. The data would 
show the financial inflow as coming from the United
Kingdom,not from the oil exporter.Still,while oil exporters’
purchases of U.S.assets through London and other non-U.S.
financial centers have surely been substantial,they are still
not likely to account for more than a fraction of the missing
petrodollars.
Moreover,tracking petrodollars is difficult because other
major countries do not report details of financial transactions
with oil exporters. Other sources allow us to identify only
another $76 billion in net external investment,in banks outside
9Country data on liabilities,excluding long-term securities,held by U.S.banks,
other depository institutions,and securities brokers and dealers are reported in
the U.S.Treasury Department’s Treasury Bulletin (various issues,Table CM-I-2).
Data on corresponding claims are reported in Table CM-II-2.Data on liabilities
and claims,excluding long-term securities,involving nonbank business enter-
prises are reported in Table CM-IV-3.Data on transactions in long-term securi-
ties are reported in Table CM-V-3. Data on foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows and outflows by country are from the U.S. Commerce Department’s
Bureau ofEconomic Analysis.FDI figures for oil exporters in the Middle East are
proxied by data for the Middle East excluding Israel;FDI figures for exporters in
Africa are proxied by data for Africa excluding Egypt and South Africa.
Table 4
Global Current Account Balances
Billions of U.S.Dollars 
2002 2006 Change
Surpluses
Oil exportersa 88 571 483
Emerging Asia 122 263 141
Japan 113 167 55
Western Europeb 57 13 -44
Deficits
United States -472 -869 -397
Miscellaneous countries -59 -130 -72
Memo:
Global discrepancy 151 -16 -167
Sources:International Monetary Fund (IMF);individual country sources;authors’estimates.
aRepresents fuel exporters as defined by the IMF,plus Norway.
bRepresents the euro area,plus Denmark,the United Kingdom,Sweden,and Switzerland.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 12, NUMBER 9
the United States.10 Simply put,the available data do not allow
us to track where the vast bulk of recent petrodollar invest-
ments have been placed.
Indirect Petrodollar Recycling
We now consider what additional insight economic theory
and the available data can offer about where petrodollar
investments have been going. Our analysis indicates that
most petrodollar investments are finding their way to the
United States, indirectly if not directly. In particular, the
increase in net financial inflows to the United States since
2002 has roughly matched the increase in net outflows from
oil exporters. This relationship suggests that petrodollar
purchases of non-U.S.assets have been generating roughly
offsetting flows from the financial markets where they were
originally invested to U.S.financial markets.
A comparison of recent current account behavior in the
United States and Japan explains how such indirect recycling
can occur.While the U.S.current account deficit deteriorated
by roughly $400 billion from 2002 to 2006,Japan’s surplus
increased by $55 billion (Table 4).The rise in the U.S.deficit
was matched by a decline in U.S.domestic saving relative to
investment spending,while the higher Japanese surplus was
matched by a rise in domestic saving relative to investment
spending.
Given this backdrop,consider the consequences of $1 bil-
lion in petrodollar purchases of Japanese assets.The pur-
chases are of course a form of lending to Japan.However,
financial market participants in Japan have not wanted to be
net borrowers in global capital markets at prevailing asset
prices and interest rates; quite the opposite, they have
wanted to undertake additional net lending.11 In this envi-
ronment,each additional $1 billion invested in Japan by an
oil exporter has to be matched by an additional $1 billion in
financial outflows from Japan to a country where financial
market participants wish to undertake additional net bor-
rowing at prevailing asset prices and interest rates.
In recent years,that country has been the United States
(Table 4).In other oil-importing countries as a whole,domes-
tic saving has been more than sufficient to finance domestic
investment spending,and the combined current account bal-
ance of these countries has remained in surplus.Given this
saving surplus, petrodollars invested outside the United
States have been indirectly recycled back into U.S.financial
markets,helping to finance the U.S.current account deficit.
As a result,the United States has been able to maintain
investment spending at a pace that otherwise would have
required higher domestic saving (reduced consumption).
Of course, investment outside the United States by oil
exporters does affect grossinternational assets and liabilities
for the recipient country.For instance,an oil exporter’s pur-
chase of $1 billion in Japanese assets would leave Japan with
an additional $1 billion in international liabilities.However,if
the desired saving-investment balance in Japan remains
unchanged, this capital inflow would push an additional 
$1 billion in Japanese funds into other markets,for example,
to purchase U.S.Treasuries.Japan would then have an addi-
tional $1 billion in international assets,and its net interna-
tional asset position would be left unchanged.And while the
oil exporter remains the ultimate source of surplus savings,
in our example the United States is the ultimate borrower.
Indirect petrodollar recycling should also have an effect
on interest rates,exchange rates,and other asset prices.In
terms ofthe example above,asset prices would have to adjust
in a way that leaves Japanese investors content with holding
$1 billion more in U.S. Treasuries and $1 billion less in
Japanese domestic assets.More generally,to accommodate
indirect petrodollar recycling, expected relative returns 
on U.S.assets would have to rise by enough to induce the
recycled funds to flow from the market where they were orig-
inally invested to the United States.
Unfortunately,it is difficult to know how large the asset
price effect of indirect petrodollar recycling might be.For
one thing, it is not possible to distinguish funds already
headed to the United States at current asset prices (whether
directly or via third-country intermediaries) from funds 
initially placed elsewhere but attracted to the United States
by actual or expected asset price changes. For another,
because the induced flow of funds could go into any U.S.
financial asset,it is hard to isolate the relevant price effect.
As a result of these difficulties,there has been little research
on this aspect of petrodollar recycling.
Official versus Private Recycling of Petrodollars
Oil exporters’external surpluses have been invested largely
through the official rather than the private sector (Table 5).
All told,net official investment abroad is expected to reach
roughly $490 billion in 2006.Foreign exchange reserves and
6
10Data are from the Bank for International Settlements (2006,Table 6A) and cover
the end of 2002 through the first half of 2006.Some other accounts,citing this
source,have pointed to a more substantial rise in oil exporters’foreign deposits at
banks outside the United States.Indeed,such deposits increased by $331 billion
over the period.However,oil exporters’liabilitiesto non-U.S.banks also grew sub-
stantially,by some $255 billion,bringing the increase in their net banking assets
to $76 billion. (Note that the Bank for International Settlements data for 
oil exporters in Asia and Africa do not include assets and liabilities involving 
U.S. banks, while data for other oil exporters—notably Russia, Norway, and
Venezuela—do.Correcting for this fact yields the $76 billion figure.)
11Our example does not assume that changes in oil prices would have no effect on
Japan’s current account balance.Rather,the example is concerned only with the
impact of oil exporters’ portfolio allocation decisions, once global current
account balances have adjusted to any change in oil prices.other central bank foreign assets are projected to account for
half of those investments.The other half is expected to be
placed abroad by national investment authorities or to repay
government external debts.(Debt repayments are netforeign
investment.) Only about $80 billion is expected to be placed
abroad by private investors.Private foreign investments from
2003 to 2005 were even smaller.
There is,perhaps,nothing surprising about the dominant
role played by the official sector in petrodollar recycling.Oil
companies in many of the largest oil exporters are state-
owned. Elsewhere, taxes on oil production or exports
account for a large fraction of government revenues.
The heavy reliance on the official sector to recycle current
account surpluses continues the recent pattern established
in the emerging Asian economies.There,too,large current
account surpluses have been recycled largely or entirely by
official investors,mostly through central bank purchases of
foreign exchange reserves.(The same was true of Japan in
2003 and 2004,but not since.) Indeed,official purchases of
foreign assets by the emerging Asian countries and oil
exporters combined could reach $770 billion this year—not
too far from the expected U.S. current account deficit of
$870 billion. Directly or indirectly, then, foreign official
investors have been the main source of financing for the
large U.S.current account deficit.
Conclusion
The effect of rising oil prices on oil-importing economies
depends on how oil exporters deploy their windfall rev-
enues.The recycling of petrodollars to purchase goods and
services produced by oil importers works directly to soften
the economic blow caused by higher oil prices in these
countries.Petrodollar recycling through investments in the
international capital markets can also ease the negative
effects on growth,albeit less directly,by providing a pool of
funds that oil importers can tap to finance their higher oil-
import bills.
During the recent run-up in oil prices,the United States
has seen only a small fraction of the increase in its pay-
ments to oil exporters recycled to purchase goods produced
locally.Significantly,however,the United States has been the
ultimate destination—even if it has not been the direct des-
tination—for petrodollars recycled into the international
financial markets. Other oil-importing countries, taken
together,have responded to higher oil prices by curtailing
consumption (boosting saving) or reducing investment
spending,leaving their current accounts in surplus.
The recycling of petrodollars into the U.S.financial mar-
kets has supported activity here by allowing for higher 
consumption and investment spending than otherwise would
have occurred. The concomitant cost has been a further
expansion of the U.S.economy’s already sizable net interna-
tional liabilities.
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Table 5
Net Foreign Investment of Oil Exporters
Billions of U.S.Dollars
2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Net foreign investment 138 217 385 571 1,311
Private investment 22 33 40 81 176
Official investment 116 184 344 490 1,134
Foreign exchange 
reserves 72 126 213 245 655
Other official 44 58 132 245 480
Sources:International Monetary Fund;Norway Government Pension Fund annual reports;
authors’estimates.
Note:Figures for 2006 are forecasts.